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The market for external ratings is dominated worldwide as well as in the European 
Union (EU) by three major credit rating agencies (CRAs). These “Big Three” are 
Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's and Fitch Ratings. Due to the oligopolistic market 
structure and possible involvement in the 2008 financial crisis, the rating agencies 
have constantly come under criticism. This was associated with stricter regulatory 
requirements to ease the situation. The EU-Regulation on credit rating agencies 
(„CRA-Regulation“) coming into force 2009 and its amendments in 2011 and in 2013 
have mainly governed such regulation. The aim of the article is to analyse potential 
regulatory impact on the still inherent oligopolistic situation on the EU rating market in 
the context of the CRA-Regulation. Selected key figures are used to observe over a 
defined period of time if and how the dominance has changed. The motivation for 
this article is the observation, that political and private efforts to establish a European 
rating agency as a counterweight to the three major agencies and other 
approaches to increase competition in the rating market, followed, which has not 
been resounding to date. In summary, it is shown that new agencies have a 
potential impact on the EU rating market and that the three major rating agencies 
still dominate the market but within a changed environment. 
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Introduction 
The market for external ratings is mainly dominated worldwide by the three major 
rating agencies Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch Ratings („Big Three“); all 
three with U.S. principal owners. The term "Big Three" in this context refers to the rating 
agencies Standard & Poors, Moody's and Fitch Ratings. With their ratings, they 
provide relevant information in the financial sector about the risk of default of 
financial instruments in the area of debt capital and assess the ability of issuers to be 
able to meet future payment obligations in full and on time. Ratings are considered 
a recognized opinion in financial investment transactions. Ratings make it easier for 
issuers to access debt capital markets (Brieger, 2012). The importance of ratings has 
already increased in the 1970s. In capital market regulation, they had become 
increasingly part of regulatory rules, which strengthened the position of the Big Three 
(Brieger, 2012). The rating agencies were assigned a virtually institutional role, in 
particular due to the regulation on capital regulation within the framework of Basel II 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004) and the associated use of external 
ratings (Beck & Wienert, 2010; Brieger, 2012). In connection with the 2008 financial 
crisis, the rating agencies and their ex post incorrect assessments within an 
oligopolistic market structure came under increasing criticism (Blaurock, 2012; 
Deipenbrock, 2010). European legislators reacted to this with the EU Rating 
Regulation that came into force in 2009; amendments were made in 2011 and 2013 
(Blaurock, 2013; EU Commision, 2009, 2011, 2013). 
Based on the regulatory efforts and the associated intent to increase competition 
on the one hand and reduce the dependence on external ratings on the other, this 
article analyses the competitive situation on the rating market. Selected key figures 
are used to check whether the market structure has changed over a specified 
period of time. Associated with this is the question of whether regulation has brought 
about a change in the oligopolistic market structure. 
The following chapter starts by explaining the development of the oligopolistic 
market structure with the major dominance of the Big Three. The empirical analysis 
shows the market situation over time. Then, in the next chapter, potential 
competitive alternatives on the rating market are discussed. The conclusion 
summarizes the essential findings and provides an outlook on further research needs 
in this subject area. 
 
The oligopolistic market structure 
An important aspect for the reasons of the market structure lies in the regulatory 
institutionalization of ratings for the financial markets. For the first time in 1936, the US 
“Controller of the Currency” stipulated that the purchase of securities that are largely 
speculative and do not meet a certain standard is prohibited. The governing body 
did not publish a more detailed definition, but referred in a footnote to the fact that 
the terms used can be found in recognized rating agencies’ manuals (Harold, 1938). 
Much later, in 1975, the the recognition as U.S. Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization (NRSRO) was awarded for the first time by the U.S. supervisory 
authority Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Consequently, only ratings of 
companies with NRSRO status could be used to determine banks' capital 
requirements. In this context, the SEC directly determined the agencies S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch Ratings (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005). The basis of the 
market-dominant position was thus laid for regulatory purposes. Since 1975, for over 
25 years, until February 2003, the SEC has granted NRSRO status to four other 
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and Exchange Commission, 2003). Accordingly, only three large NRSROs existed 
sustainably until then. At this time Dominion Bond Ratings Service (DBRS) (February 
2003) and A.M. Best Company, Inc. (March 2005) became other agencies 
recognized as NRSROs by the SEC and entered the market of regulatory recognized 
agencies (Langohr & Langhorn, 2008). Currently nine rating agencies are registered 
as NRSROs (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2020). With the so-called 
"Credit Rating Agency Reform Act" (United States Congress, 2006), enacted in 2006, 
rating agencies were able to register with the US Register SEC as a "Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization" (NRSRO) instead of being nominated. The 
law made it possible for smaller rating agencies to register under certain conditions, 
opening the market to a larger number of rating agencies. 
The EU Rating Regulation (EU Commision, 2009) entered into force at European 
Union (EU) level in 2009. The aim of the regulation is to ensure a high level of 
consumer and investor protection by applying common quality requirements for 
ratings given within the EU. The regulation also stipulates that a rating agency must 
apply for registration in order to be recognized as an external rating agency 
(External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI)). Thus, the status as ECAI represents the 
European counterpart to the NRSRO of the U.S. SEC. The European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) (Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010), established on January 01, 
2011, has powers over credit rating agencies with regards to registration and 
ongoing supervision. The admission requirements and the associated necessary 
information for the registration of rating agencies can be seen as an obstacle to 
entering the rating market. Newly established rating agencies are particularly 
affected because they do not yet have sufficient experience and the necessary 
organizational requirements. However, the regulation for the registration of rating 
agencies enables exemption from certain information details or requirements. In 
view of the demand for more competition on the rating market, high entry barriers 
for start-ups should be avoided (EU Commision, 2012). 
A second important aspect for the existence of the oligopolistic market structure is 
that the effectiveness of ratings can only be observed ex post. Consequently, taking 
the rating into account when regulating or making investment decisions are made, 
requires trust in the analysis of solvency. This trust can be acquired by the agencies 
through many years of experience, the use of statistically valid methods and correct 
credit ratings in the past (Haar, 2009). This results in a reputation for the quality of the 
rating, which is crucial for the success of the agencies. The historical development 
and the aspect of reputation illustrate the difficult successful market access of new 
rating agencies and their establishment in the market. Once an issuer has decided 
on obtaining a rating from an agency with a corresponding reputation, any change 
in agency or unsubscribing is potentially questioned by investors. The assumption 
may be made that a possible "downgrading" should be avoided. This will force a 
concentration effect on the rating market (Lerch, 2010).   
 
Empirical analysis 
With the EU Rating Regulation of 2009 and its amendments in 2011 and 2013, 
numerous objectives and sub-objectives are being pursued. High consumer and 
investor protection, the promotion of competition, independence from rating 
agencies, the excessive use of ratings by market participants and a regular rotation 
of rating agencies are to be cited. In particular, the 2013 amendment aims to 
strengthen competition between rating agencies and to encourage the use of 
smaller ones. For example, in accordance with Article 8c of the current EU Rating 






ENTRENOVA 10-12, September 2020 Virtual conference, Croatia 
double ratings in order to guarantee a second, independent rating (EU Commision, 
2013). Article 8d also determines the method of selection when mandating rating 
agencies for SFI. Consequently, if an issuer commissions at least two rating agencies 
to issue a rating for the same structured financial product, one of the two 
commissioned rating agencies may have a maximum market share of 10 percent 
(EU Commision, 2013). A structured financial product is a financial product “that 
consists of one or several baseline values and a derivative component“ 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority, 2014). Traditional  financial products such as corporate bonds are 
therefore exempt from this double rating (agency) requirement. The SFI market 
segment, is the second largest contributor to revenues at Moody’s, after the 
corporate finance segment (Moody’s, 2019).  
These regulatory measures at EU level clarify, among other things: Efforts to 
increase competition on the rating market or to reduce the dominance of the three 
major rating agencies. From this, the research question can be derived whether the 
EU regulatory provisions have an effect on the oligopolistic market structure of the 
rating market and the market shares of the Big Three. 
The following hypothesis can be derived on the basis of the research question: 
• Since the EU Rating Regulation came into force, the market shares of the 
three major rating agencies and the oligopolistic market structure of the rating 
market in the EU have remained unchanged.  
The research hypothesis aims to analyse the dominance or the oligopolistic 
market structure of the rating market at the level of the EU. To test the hypothesis, key 
figures from the overall rating market and the three major rating agencies are 
determined over a certain period of time. The time series analysis represents amongst 
other things the revenues of the Big Three on the EU market. The market share of the 
respective rating agency is also shown over time. The analysis relates to the rating 
agencies registered by ESMA to operate on accredited regulatory status within the 
EU. The results of the analysis can be used to validate or refute the hypothesis. First, 
the revenues of the Big Three are presented. 
The data in Figure 1 essentially show a continuous increase in revenues over the 
observation period. S&P and Moody’s in particular have been able to significantly 
increase their revenues in recent years. FitchRatings remains at a constant level. With 
these data, however, it should be noted that the European market for the three 
major rating agencies is not consistently restricted in terms of revenues in the 
respective annual reports. S&P reports the revenue for the European region, whereas 
Moody’s reports the revenue of the EMEA (Europe, Middle East, Africa) economic 
area. FitchRatings, on the other hand, refers to its registered rating agencies in the EU 
when listing revenues (McGraw Hill Financial & S&P Global, 2014-2019); Moody’s, 
2014-2019; FitchRatings, 2013-2020). The agency publishes the so-called EU 
Transparency Report since 2012 for the financial year 2011. Moody's (from 2010) and 
S&P (from 2015) also publish such a report, which is likewise a basis for assessing the 
market situation (market shares) in the EU and confirms the authors' argumentation 
and hypothesis (McGraw Hill Financial & S&P Global, 2016-2020; Moody’s, 2011-2020). 
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Figure 1 
Revenues of the Big Three in segments including the EU 2011-2018 
 
Source: McGraw Hill Financial & S&P Global (2014-2019); Moody’s (2014-2019), FitchRatings 
(2013-2020) 
 
Another key figure that reflects the competitive situation of the rating market in 
the EU is the number of rating agencies registered by ESMA. As ESMA only started its 
work on January 1, 2011, the data published by the institution will only be available 
from 2012 onwards. Figure 2 shows the number of registered rating agencies, with the 
three major rating agencies being grouped under Big Three and the other agencies 
under "Others". 
Figure 2, based on the sheer number of registered rating agencies, does not 
suggest that the rating market has an oligopolistic market structure, but suggests 
healthy competition. In addition to the three major rating agencies, over 20 other 
agencies are apparently active on the market. Over the course of 2012, other 
agencies entered the market, on average one agency per year. It should be 
emphasized that not all rating agencies offer all rating services, it is rather that the 
majority of these agencies only offer certain rating services (European Securities and 
Markets Authority, 2019). The existing oligopolistic market structure, despite the 
number of rating agencies, is clearly based on a further key figure. 
In addition to the presentation of revenues over the period and the number of 
registered rating agencies in the EU, the market shares (here based on annual 
revenues in the EU) are another important key figure for analysing the competitive 
situation. The three major rating agencies are shown individually, whereas all other 
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Figure 2 
Number of registered CRAs in the EU 2012-2018 
 
Source: European Securities and Markets Authority (2014-2020) 
 
The analysis of the market shares from Figure 3 shows (in contrast to the number of 
rating agencies) the large market share of the Big Three and, with it, the oligopolistic 
market structure. S&P in particular was able to increase its market share over the 
period under review from 2012-2018. Overall, the three major rating agencies have a 
market share of over 90 percent. In contrast, the rest (over 20 rating agencies) 
together have less than ten percent. It is noteworthy here that the number of rating 
agencies according to Figure 2 has increased, but the market share (“Others”) has 
decreased with 2012 as the reference year.  
In comparison to the revenues achieved (Figure 1), for which S&P and Moody’s 
showed significant increases at the end of the period under review, it can be seen in 
connection with the market shares in the EU that the revenues increases tend to 
have been achieved outside the EU. Otherwise, the respective market share of the 
corresponding rating agencies in Figure 3 would potentially have increased in a 
similar way. 
 
Interpretation of the results 
The starting point of the empirical analysis was the investigation of the competitive 
situation of the rating market in the EU. From this, the research question was derived 
as to whether the entry of the EU Rating Regulation coming into force was 
associated with a change in the market shares of the Big Three and the oligopolistic 
market structure. 
Relevant key figures from the rating market were analysed to answer this question. 
First of all, the revenues of the Big Three over the observation period from 2011 to 
2018 are shown with reference to different delimitations of the European market. The 
results show that the revenues of S&P and Moody’s in particular increased 
considerably in the period. S&P revenues have increased by a total of 62 percent 
since 2011. The rating agency Moody’s almost doubled its revenues. Here the 
increase is about 94 percent. The main revenue increases of Moody’s and S&P have 
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market shares in the EU), though. FitchRatings was only able to increase revenues by 
a total of approx. 8.6 percent over this period. The reported revenues of the Big Three 
refer to a different definition in regional segment reporting. In conjunction with the 
analysis of market shares, the trend is that the revenues of the Big Three in the EU 
have remained constant. A stagnation or general decline in revenues of the Big 
Three in the period under review, which could indicate lower market power or 
increased competition, cannot be identified with this key figure, though.  
 
Figure 3 
Market share of registered CRAs in the EU 2012-2018 
 
Source: European Securities and Markets Authority (2014-2020) 
 
Furthermore, the number of rating agencies registered in the EU by ESMA has 
been considered since 2012. The numbers show that in addition to the Big Three 
there are 25 other rating agencies in 2018. The number has increased since 2012 from 
22 registered agencies to a total of 28 rating agencies in 2018. This means an 
increase of approximately 27 percent over the entire period and an average of 
approximately four percent or one rating agency per year. It shows that there is 
potential to use other rating agencies and their services. Considering the market 
shares, this has apparently not yet been exhausted. 
The additional inclusion of the market share indicator illustrates in particular the 
competitive situation on the rating market. The results over the observation period 
from 2012 to 2018 show the expected clear dominance of the Big Three with over 90 
percent market share. The slight increase in the number of rating agencies does not 
have the effect that they lose market share on a larger scale. All smaller rating 
agencies together only have a market share of less than ten percent in the EU. The 
prevailing oligopolistic market structure can be clearly determined on the basis of 
this key figure.  
Taking into account the results of the empirical analysis, it can be stated with 
regard to the formulated hypothesis that since the entry of the European Union 
Rating Regulation came into force, the dominant market shares of the Big Three 
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has pursued to exist in the EU. To date, efforts to strengthen competition and reduce 
the dominance of the Big Three associated with the EU regulation have not been 
achieved. Consequently, the hypothesis formulated at the beginning can be 
validated. 
It can be said that the oligopolistic market structure and the associated market 
power of the Big Three continue. Alternative endeavours always have to assert 
themselves on the market and, according to the authors’ view, will find it difficult to 
form a competitive alternative. This includes, for example, a network of small rating 
agencies (Meeh-Bunse & Sattler, 2012; Meeh-Bunse et al., 2014). However, efforts 
with a chance to be operational should continue to be promoted on the basis of 
regulation, as it is already the case with the current rating regulation and, for 
example, the associated commissioning of double ratings for issuers of SFI. In the long 
term, according to the authors, other rating agencies could assert themselves on the 
market and build up the necessary reputation leading to more competition and 
hence to improved market efficiency. 
 
Conclusion 
The dominance of the major rating agencies S&P, Moody’s and Fitch can be 
historically explained on the one hand by the anchoring of their ratings in regulatory 
procedures by the SEC and its forerunner authority, a related registration as a NRSRO 
in 1975 and subsequent developments. The oligopoly thus solidified over decades. 
On the other hand, the dominant position can be explained by the reputation of the 
agencies, which results from their many years of experience. The reputation is 
reflected in the preference of financial market participants, according to which 
credit ratings of companies, their financial debt or debt related instruments can only 
be broadly beneficially placed on the financial markets if they are Big Three rated. 
At the EU level, the market structure and the actions of the rating agencies were 
only increasingly questioned in connection with the financial market crisis and, as a 
result, measures to regulate and strengthen competition were derived. The EU Rating 
Regulation clarifies the EU's efforts for more competition in the rating market. 
This article describes the competitive situation of the rating market in the context 
of EU regulation. A directly measurable influence of the EU regulations on the 
competitive situation represents the limits of this article. The article is also limited to 
certain indicators for assessing the competitive situation. Further indicators can be 
analysed in future research projects with regard to the rating market. There is also a 
need for research to develop alternative options on the rating market that could 
reduce the dependence on the Big Three. Ideas like a public rating agency, located 
at the central bank, or a network of smaller rating agencies need to be further 
researched. 
In summary, it can be stated that bare regulatory requirements do not 
automatically change the competitive situation or that the oligopolistic market 
structure is necessarily changed as a result. Ex ante regulatory action expectedly has 
to be impactful in achieving the political goals. Ex post implementation of such 
action consequently needs to be controlled. The biggest difficulty for the small rating 
agencies will be to build up the necessary reputation and the associated trust in a 
rating judgment. The creditworthiness statements must receive the broad 
acceptance of the financial market participants, which will probably only be 
possible over a longer period of time or by recourse on valid existing data (Meeh-
Bunse & Sattler, 2012). Other potential market solutions, such as a network of smaller 
rating agencies, could provide further dynamic in the market and possibly meet the 






ENTRENOVA 10-12, September 2020 Virtual conference, Croatia 
commission and to take into account the judgment of smaller rating agencies could 
have a strong impact as well as public incentive schemes.  
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